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CITIZENS UNITED, LIBERTY, AND
JOHN STUART MILL
MELINA CONSTANTINE BELL*
The First Amendment, adopted to safeguard human liberty and autonomy,
was construed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2008 Citizens United
decision in a way that undermines those important foundational values.
This turn in First Amendment jurisprudence represents a radical depar-
ture from the Anglo-American free expression tradition in law, as well as
in political philosophy, represented prominently by John Stuart Mill, the
author of On Liberty.  Although the decision is nominally premised on
the interests of citizens to avoid discrimination based on speaker identity, to
hear others’ uncensored expressions of ideas, to access political information
that will enable them to participate effectively in democratic government,
and to be protected when they engage in political dissent, the blow that the
decision deals to campaign finance reform produces effects that instead
undermine human liberty and self-government.
INTRODUCTION
A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission, overturned a limitation on corporate campaign
expenditures, explaining that “First Amendment standards . . . ‘must
give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling
speech.’”1  The Court justified its decision by relying on the importance
of protecting individual liberty, and in particular, free speech, from
government interference.2  That free speech is an essential component
of a well-functioning democracy enjoys a long and exalted history, both
in political philosophy and in Constitutional jurisprudence.  One of the
best known defenses of its significance can be found in John Stuart
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1. 558 U.S. 310, 327 (2010) (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70
(1964))).
2. Id. at 372.
1
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Mill’s venerated treatise, On Liberty.  There, he claims that no society is
free that does not respect the “absolute freedom of opinion and senti-
ment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theo-
logical,” including the freedom to express and publish such opinions.3
The Court’s description of the First Amendment’s purpose is strik-
ingly similar to Mill’s defense of the principle of liberty:
[The First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove gov-
ernmental constraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach would com-
port with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.4
In Citizens United, the Court held itself out as advancing the Anglo-
American free speech tradition represented by Mill, reflected in past
American jurisprudence.  I aim to demonstrate that, to the contrary,
Citizens United reveals that the legal conception of free speech, and legal
justification for protecting it from government restrictions, have been
severely distorted.  Consequently, the First Amendment’s free speech
clause has become antithetical to human autonomy and well-being.
Recent Court decisions have undermined the liberal tradition of free
expression that Mill champions.  Mill represents this tradition well
because of his advocacy for liberty and free expression, and his princi-
ple (the principle of liberty) for restricting the moral authority of gov-
ernment to limit individual freedoms.  Mill feared the encroachment
on individual liberties of democratic government no less than auto-
cratic government.  As I will argue, however, the more serious threat to
individual autonomy today is not government, but wealthy and power-
ful business corporations.  In a painfully ironic twist, the Court has
handed these corporations a formidable tool for constraining the
autonomy of human individuals.
I begin by providing a brief overview of Citizens United and the cam-
paign finance reform measure it struck down, identifying the four justif-
icatory reasons relevant to my argument that the Court provides for its
decision.  Then, I evaluate each reason from Mill’s standpoint, conclud-
ing that Mill would be unlikely to regard any of the Court’s four appeals
to individual liberty as supporting the decision.
I. CITIZENS UNITED: AN OVERVIEW
In Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court entertained a challenge
to § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), also known
as the McCain-Feingold Act.  Section 203 forbids corporations and
unions to spend funds from their general treasury to advocate expressly
for the election or defeat of a particular candidate for federal office,
3. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 18 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL
IN 33 VOLS. 213, 225 (John M. Robson ed., 1977).
4. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
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using broadcast, cable or satellite media, within thirty days of a primary
election.  In a 1990 case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,5 the
Court upheld a state campaign finance provision with essentially the
same restriction, finding that “the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form” frustrate a compelling government interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, an interest
that was recognized in Buckley v. Valeo6 in 1976.
Buckley was the first decision that found campaign finance restric-
tions to violate the First Amendment, construing the independent expendi-
ture of money advocating the election or defeat of a particular candidate
to be a form of political speech that could not be restricted.7  An expen-
diture is independent in the sense that it is not spent by, coordinated
with, or spent at the direction of the candidate on her own campaign.
The Court also found a limit on the amount of money a candidate can
spend on, or contribute to, her campaign to be an unconstitutional
burden on free speech.8 Buckley did recognize, however, a sufficiently
important government interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption, which could otherwise undermine public
confidence in representative democracy “to a disastrous extent.”9  To
protect this interest, Buckley found it justifiable for the government to
limit the amounts of direct contributions by individuals and groups to
candidates’ political campaigns, recognizing that enormous direct con-
tributions could lead to, or look like, bribery.10
Thus, Buckley forbade legislative restriction of independent
expenditures, but Austin more recently upheld Michigan’s restriction,
which applies only to corporate expenditures from general treasury
funds.  The rationale for treating corporations differently involves the
peculiarity of a corporation as a speaker.  Corporations are specifically
permitted by statute to form political action committees (“PACs”) and
to solicit voluntary contributions to the PAC from shareholders/mem-
bers and employees who support its political messages.  PACs can
legally engage in campaign activities, and regulators consider it proper
for them to do so.  However, when a corporation contributes money
from its general treasury, it spends corporate money to advance politi-
cal messages that shareholders/members and employees might oppose.
Even the managers or officers who write checks from the general trea-
sury have a fiduciary responsibility to spend corporate money only to
advance corporate, not personal, interests.11  Commercial interests
translate into certain political interests, and these are advanced by cor-
5. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
6. 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 52.
9. Id. at 27 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
10. Id. at 25.
11. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 467 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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porate independent expenditures from general treasury funds.12  Politi-
cal messages conveyed using corporate money may not represent the
views of any human beings.13
Moreover, as Austin had pointed out, corporations are granted spe-
cial legal advantages.  Their liability is limited, they are given perpetual
life, and they are permitted to accumulate and distribute assets in an
exclusively advantageous fashion.  This allows them to concentrate
wealth in ways not enjoyed by natural persons.14  Thus, corporations
receive an unfair advantage in a political marketplace where money
counts as constitutionally protected speech, and where it strongly influ-
ences political outcomes.15
Declining to treat corporations differently from natural persons
with respect to political speech, Citizens United overruled Austin.  In
doing so, it provided four justifications for its decision that are relevant
to my argument.  The first two involve what I call liberty rights; the sec-
ond two, effective democracy concerns.
1. Speaker identity non-discrimination.  According to the Court,
the First Amendment forbids the government to restrict speech based
on the speaker’s identity or characteristics.  Unmoved by the dissent’s
argument that the First Amendment was intended to protect human
speakers,16 the Court buttresses its claim with the second justification.
2. Listener’s right to hear.  When there is any doubt, explains the
Court, restrictions on political speech should be disfavored because
society is harmed when “deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas.”17  That is, the Court relies on the public’s right to hear political
ideas, not just the right of corporations to express them.
3. Access to information for political decision-making.  The Court
regards itself as protecting citizens’ access to information by enabling
corporations to tap general treasury funds for independent expendi-
tures on election advocacy.  Otherwise, in its view, fewer issues can be
discussed in less depth, and fewer people can be reached for the
exchange of ideas.  A free exchange is essential to democracy if govern-
ment officials are to be held accountable to the people, the citizenry is
to be able to make informed political choices, and the people are to be
able to engage in enlightened self-government.18
4. Protection for political dissenters.  It is dangerous, the Court
maintains, for the government to be permitted to discriminate among
speakers because this can be used to silence content toward which the
government is hostile:
12. See id. at 394–95, 454–55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 658–60 (1990)).
15. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 439–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 335 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)); see also id. at
354.
18. Id. at 339–40.
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By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speaker’s voice.  The Government may not by these
means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine
for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.
The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas
that flow from each.19
Thus, the Court ties this last justification to its very first justification.
A related development further erodes attempts to regulate cam-
paign finance by pronouncing another provision of BCRA an unconsti-
tutional infringement on liberty interests.  In McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission,20 the Court struck down the aggregate limit (the
total amount any one person can contribute to all candidates or com-
mittees during an election cycle), finding it an unconstitutional
restraint on speech.21 McCutcheon did not deny that preventing corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption are compelling government
interests, but found the aggregate limit unnecessary to safeguard those
interests, which the Court believed were already adequately protected
by base limits (limits on how much a donor may contribute to any one
candidate or committee).22  It disregarded Congressional findings that
sophisticated mechanisms are used for circumventing base limits, as
well as the dissent’s protest of the apparent divergence from Buckley,
which had regarded the aggregate limit as constitutionally acceptable
because a donor would still be permitted to volunteer, or speak in other
ways than through monetary contributions, to an unlimited degree.23
McCutcheon rejected Buckley’s conclusion because, the Court noted, a
person has only a limited amount of time to spend volunteering and
speaking in person about candidates and campaign issues, so she
should be permitted to support candidates through spending, which
does not require additional time.  This recognizes that while everyone’s
time is limited, some have large amounts of money to spend.24
McCutcheon therefore transferred even more political power to big
donors, including corporations, to advance their interests.25
19. Id. at 340–41.
20. See generally 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion).  Although McCutcheon is
a plurality decision, it is likely to be influential.
21. Id. at 1442.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1448; see also id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1448–49.
25. The Constitutional rights of corporations seem to be expanding, and not just
within the campaign finance realm.  Many for-profit corporations, as corporate persons,
have recently been granted the First Amendment right to free religious exercise. See
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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II. FOUR JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENS UNITED AND WHY MILL
WOULD REJECT THEM
Now I will demonstrate how, from a Millian viewpoint, Citizens
United undermines those values that the Court cites to justify it.  In par-
ticular, Citizen United’s augmentation of corporate power diminishes
individual autonomy, human welfare, and social progress by chilling
political expression and undermining the sort of democratic govern-
ment that is conducive to high aggregate utility.
A. Speaker Identity Non-Discrimination
The Citizens United Court’s first justification rests on the premise
that there is no legitimate reason for the government to discriminate
between corporate and human speakers.  However, the government
may restrict political speech, consistent with the First Amendment, if it
has a compelling interest in doing so and the regulation at issue is the
least restrictive means of protecting that interest.
There are several reasons that the government interest in regulat-
ing corporate expression financed by general treasury expenditures is
more compelling than its interest in regulating the political speech of
human beings.  I will mention three.  First, the sole motive that a busi-
ness corporation has for engaging in political speech is market advan-
tage leading to profit.  Neither public welfare nor human self-interest is
represented by this speech, except coincidentally.  In fact, as I explain
below, there are good reasons to believe that policies facilitating corpo-
rate profit tend to undermine human welfare.  Second, as the Citizens
United dissent urges, corporations are legislatively granted advantages
that permit them unfairly to influence the political process.  Third, the
analysis in Citizens United ignores the idea that society should be gov-
erned for the benefit of the human, not corporate, members of it.
Moreover, Mill’s principle of liberty is inapplicable to corporations
because they are not subjects of experience.  Mill endorses as his basic
moral criterion the principle of utility, a version of the Greatest Aggre-
gate Happiness Principle: “actions are right in proportion as they tend
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness.”26  Mill qualifies this principle in three ways relevant to
understanding who has moral standing under it.  First, the happiness of
each human being affected by a moral decision is considered equally in
the utilitarian assessment.27  Second, as a rule utilitarian, Mill believes
that we should follow general policies or rules that tend to promote
aggregate happiness, rather than trying to promote maximal happiness
with each particular action on each occasion.28  And third, Mill’s con-
ception of pleasure includes not only sensual pleasure, but also
“pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the
moral sentiments,” which are even more valuable, as those who have
26. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL IN 33 VOLS., supra note 3, at 203, 209–10.
27. Id. at 213–14, 218–19.
28. Id. at 220, 224–25.
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become competently acquainted with the various kinds of pleasures can
attest.29
Because only sentient beings can experience pleasure and pain,
only their interests count for Mill in figuring aggregate net utility, and
thus in determining whether a class of actions is right based on the
tendency of its outcomes.  Mill seems to regard corporations as strate-
gies for organizing capital, not as “persons” with indispensable liberty
rights.30  Since businesses are not sentient, they have no direct moral
standing.  Although the utility of sentient individuals can be affected by
their relationships to corporations, these effects are considered parts of
the person’s experience when assessing her utility.  In fact, corporations
affect the utility of individual humans in the same way many other
things (features of the natural environment, for example) do, but enti-
ties without experiences do not have direct moral standing simply
because they affect human experience positively or negatively.  They
have indirect moral standing.  Thus, corporations and other voluntary
associations of people have moral rights derived from the principle of
utility when, and only when, recognizing such rights produces a higher
net balance of aggregate utility than not recognizing them.  However,
voluntary associations of people, including corporations, have no moral
rights protected by the principle of liberty.
Mill argues in On Liberty that individual people have liberty rights
entitling them to a sphere of action free from government interference.
The purpose of Mill’s principle of liberty is to delineate “the nature and
limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over
the individual.”31  Mill explains:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. . . .  [T]he only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.32
This principle is best understood as jurisdictional.  When a class of indi-
vidual actions falls within society’s purview, the overall net utility gener-
ated by exercising social power to limit individual liberty, compared
with the overall net utility of not doing so, is calculated, and coercive
social power is exercised when, and only when, and to the extent that,
coercive social regulation of the class of actions produces the greatest
overall net utility.  When a class of individual actions is outside society’s
jurisdiction, however, these actions absolutely may not be coercively
interfered with, even if society intends to compel individuals to perform
actions that would, if done willingly and without compulsion, produce
the greatest overall net utility.
29. Id. at 210–12.
30. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUART MILL IN 33 VOLS., supra note 3, at 897–901.
31. Mill, supra note 3, at 217.
32. Id. at 223.
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Mill regards the principle of liberty as a “mediate axiom”33 of the
principle of utility, because liberty is essential to human well-being.
That is, greatest aggregate utility cannot be achieved unless people are
guaranteed a right to non-interference within the zone protected by the
principle of liberty.  Thus, the principle of liberty is necessary to secure
“utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of
man as a progressive being.”34  A person suffers an injustice whenever a
right—such as the right to liberty—is violated.
The reason against over-regulating businesses, according to Mill, is
not justice but utility.  Because “trade is a social act[,] [w]hoever under-
takes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the
interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his con-
duct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society.”35  Mill
approves of trade regulations whenever and only when aggregate bene-
fits outweigh aggregate costs.36  By contrast, Mill argues, government
regulation of individual action cannot be accomplished with moral jus-
tification simply by weighing costs and benefits, since the principle of
liberty limits government authority over every human being.  Without
the principle of liberty’s constraint on social authority over the individ-
ual, aggregate utility in society cannot be maximized.37  So Mill recog-
nizes an important reason to treat individual human speakers and
corporate speakers differently: while the former are sentient, have
direct moral standing, and bear rights secured by the principle of lib-
erty, none of this is true of the latter.  Because the rights of associations
are governed solely by the principle of utility and not by the principle
of liberty, the constraints on corporate liberty imposed by campaign
finance regulations can be permitted based on a direct utility calcula-
tion in cases that would be foreclosed by the principle of liberty if indi-
vidual persons sought to speak instead.  So while individual owners,
investors, and employees of commercial, trade and other organizations
all have rights protected by the principle of liberty, the organizations
themselves do not.
Another reason Mill would distinguish between human and corpo-
rate speakers derives from concerns about tyrannical social power.  Mill
argues that fully realized human beings, by nature, are unique, creative,
and expressive.  Institutional structures that transform humans into
instruments of production deform human character.38  Unfortunately,
33. JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 289 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 2007).
34. Mill, supra note 3, at 213, 224.
35. Id. at 293.
36. Id. at 292–93.
37. Even if Mill did believe that corporations could be subjects of pleasant and
painful experiences, he would disagree that financial contributions to political campaigns
are equivalent to “speech” within the purview of the principle of liberty.  Contributing to
political campaigns is not mere speech but political participation.  As Mill notes when he
distinguishes between publishing an opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor,
and shouting this same opinion in a mob gathered at a corn dealer’s house, “no one
pretends that actions should be as free as opinions.” Id. at 260.
38. Id. at 262–65, 310.
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custom and public opinion tend to wear down individuality, creativity,
and expressiveness, assimilating individuals into a mass of “collective
mediocrity.”39  Unjustified social interference into an individual’s
proper sphere of action inhibits not only individual autonomy, self-
development, and creativity, but retards social progress by vitiating
potential innovators.  For Mill, individuality is not only a “principal
ingredient” of individual well-being, but the different “experiments in
living” that people, given the freedom, engage in impel social
progress.40
Institutional forces that convert individuals into mediocre masses
include government, organized religion, and coercive majority opinion.
These forces impose penalties on those who refuse to conform to their
rules, often based on personal preferences.41  Such coercion, which all
three of these forces exert, is illegitimate according to Mill’s principle
of liberty.
Mill regards government, even democratic government, as a poten-
tial threat to individual liberty because of its power.  Hobbes claimed
that a rational person will voluntarily submit to the authority of govern-
ment to receive protection from others, who otherwise would infringe
her interests.  This necessity arises, for Hobbes, from rough equality
among all human beings in intellectual and moral powers.42  An indi-
vidual, however, is no match for an immense power such as govern-
ment, which makes Mill wary.43
Mill also recognizes that government is not the only source of
undue infringement of individual liberty.  Private entities, especially
when leveraging institutional rules favoring them, can be as well.  Thus,
absence of government intervention from private interactions does not
always leave the parties involved freer to pursue their own objectives.  In
some instances, government forbearance results in the exploitation or
abuse of the weaker party by the stronger.  There, the less powerful
party would be free to pursue her objectives only if government power
were exercised to restrain the stronger private party from infringing the
less powerful private party’s proper sphere of action.
Mill’s understanding of the need for government to protect the
vulnerable from private abuses is evidenced by his advocacy for the
reform of marriage laws that place married women at the mercy of their
husbands.  When the government, respecting “family privacy,” refuses
to intervene in marital relations, this provides husbands with legal cover
to harm wives with impunity.  To many in Mill’s time, it appeared that
such matters were between private parties who had entered voluntarily
into a marriage contract.  But since the government defined the institu-
39. Id. at 268.
40. Id. at 260–61.
41. Id. at 268–74.
42. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 174–82 (Floating Press 2009) (1651).
43. See, e.g., Mill, supra note 3, at 306–07 (“The . . . most cogent reason for restrict-
ing the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its
power.”); Mill, supra note 30, at 939–40.
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tion of marriage, and gave husbands power over wives, Mill argues that
it may not stand by while husbands violate wives’ moral rights.44
The employment context has a similar structure.  Suppose the state
establishes and maintains an economy in which non-owning laborers
work for non-laboring owners, and then refuses to intervene when the
employer’s stronger bargaining position permits it to secure an unfair
deal.  While the state does not thereby infringe the employee’s rights, it
creates a regime in which the employer, a private party, can do so.  In
defense of laws setting a maximum number of work hours, Mill
remarks,
There are matters in which the interference of law is required, not
to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own inter-
est, but to give effect to that judgment: they being unable to give
effect to it except by concert, which concert again cannot be effec-
tual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law.45
Workers judge that they would benefit from labor regulation, and some
measure must be taken to overcome the collective action problem that
otherwise would exist.  In Mill’s example, defectors from a voluntary
agreement to work only nine hours per day would have advantages in
the market and thus a reason to defect.  If everyone defected and
worked ten hours, then everyone would be expected to work ten hours,
even though everyone would prefer to work only nine.  A mechanism
that enforces adherence to the agreement makes it possible for all
workers to get what they prefer (in this case a nine-hour day) without
fear of suffering market disadvantages.46  Thus, the only way to give
effect to workers’ choice is to prohibit employers from trying to under-
mine workers’ choice using employers’ unequal bargaining power to
persuade workers to defect.
Similar reasoning should apply to corporate political spending.  As
we saw above, the state grants special privileges to corporations,
enhancing their ability to concentrate wealth.  They can then leverage
that wealth in the political marketplace to obtain outcomes impossible
for any but perhaps a handful of the wealthiest human beings.  Thus,
state rules granting special rights to corporations provide them with an
unfair political advantage over the vast majority of human citizens.  Mill
would therefore likely regard the state as responsible to prevent abuses
that private corporations can exert over private individuals in the politi-
cal arena.  These abuses are made possible by the state’s own rules, as in
the cases of marriage and employment practices of Mill’s day.
Corporations today can threaten individual autonomy and self-
development, as well as social progress, at least to the same degree as
government, organized religion, and majority opinion.  In a large,
diverse society such as the United States, a person who wishes to throw
off the yoke of institutional religion or public opinion can, to a greater
44. Mill, supra note 3, at 301–02; John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in 21 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL IN 33 VOLS. 213, supra note 3, at 259, 323–40.
45. Mill, supra note 30, at 956.
46. Id. at 956–58.
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extent than in Mill’s day, do so by changing where one lives, whom one
associates with, and so forth.  But corporations influence the basic struc-
ture of society as much as government does, and recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions seem to imply that there are few Constitutional checks
on them.  Corporations might therefore present a greater threat to
individual freedom and well-being than even government does, while
also threatening the existence of democratic government itself.
Citizens United takes the position that there is nothing wrong in
allowing the entities that spend the most money, operating through vot-
ers and legislators, to determine laws and policies.47  Because the Court
postulates that the First Amendment prohibits regulation of speech
based on the speaker’s identity, the government may not limit political
spending based on a speaker’s opportunity to accumulate wealth.
When the government tries to level the electoral playing field, remarks
the Court, it must make impermissible judgments concerning which
“strengths” are allowed to play a role in the outcome of an election.
Voters are supposed to determine this for themselves.48  Moreover, the
Court is indignant at the government’s attempt to “muffle the voices
that best represent the most significant segments of the economy.”49
The Citizens United Court maintains that preventing “any ‘undue
influence’ generated by a speaker’s ‘large expenditures’ would be out-
weighed ‘by the loss for democratic processes resulting from the restric-
tions upon free and full public discussion,’”50 such that allowing undue
influence would be the lesser evil.  The Court repeats its judgment in
Buckley that the government has no legitimate interest “in equalizing
the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome
of elections.”51  And finally, “The fact that speakers may have influence
over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are
corrupt: ‘favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representa-
tive politics.’”52  Although Citizens United claims that “[t]he First
Amendment’s protections do not depend on the speaker’s ‘financial
ability to engage in public discussion,’”53 as a practical matter consider-
able wealth is required to run for office, to get one’s point of view heard
by the public or lawmakers, or to participate in any other significant way
in government.
Unlike the Court, Mill is troubled by correlations between political
influence and wealth.54  Moreover, Mill would prioritize the speech of
natural persons over corporations, especially in the domains of political
debate and decision-making.  Since corporations are not sentient, they
47. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
48. Id. at 349–51.
49. Id. at 354 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58
(2003)).
50. Id. at 343–44 (quoting United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106,
143 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring)).
51. Id. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)).
52. Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297).
53. Id. at 350 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49).
54. John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL IN 33 VOLS., supra note 3, at 1, 272–75.
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have no moral rights protected by the principle of liberty, but only
those derived directly from the principle of utility.  Because they are
powerful without effective checks, threatening to unduly constrain indi-
vidual liberty, autonomy, and self-development, measures must be
taken to restrict corporations’ power to be compatible with high aggre-
gate utility.  There are good reasons, from a Millian standpoint, to dis-
criminate among the speech of natural persons and the so-called
‘speech’ of corporations.
Thus, the government has a compelling reason to restrict corpo-
rate expenditures on electioneering communications, even though the
political expression of human individuals is not restricted in the same
way.  The Court’s judgment to the contrary is mistaken.  Discrimination
between human and corporate speakers is justified by a compelling
state interest, is constitutionally permissible, and is both compatible
with, and necessary for, the robust protection of individual liberties for
which Mill advocates.
B. Listener’s Right to Hear
The Court’s second reason for invalidating the campaign spending
restriction is the listener’s right to hear political messages that any
speaker wishes to express.  This right prohibits the government from
placing obstacles in the way of the messages of any speaker, corporate
or otherwise, because the listener has a right to discern for herself
which messages are credible and important.  This may seem like a view
with which Mill would be sympathetic.  Freedom of expression occupies
a special role for Mill in enabling autonomy and self-development, as
well as producing an informed and educated society.  What, if anything,
do human beings want to hear from corporate speakers?  Corporate
speakers, remember, are expressing viewpoints that are not necessarily
held by any human beings.  What purposes might corporations have in
addressing humans?  Two common purposes are to sell products or ser-
vices (commercial advertisements) and to convince humans to support
political positions that serve business corporations’ commercial inter-
ests (political advertisements).  First, consider commercial advertising.
Some people appreciate some commercial advertising for its
entertainment value.  There are advertisements on the internet that
receive many views because they are popular among audiences, and
Super Bowl audiences eagerly anticipate the high-budget commercials
that debut during this expensive time slot.  Generally, however, people
find advertisements intrusive and annoying.  Technology has been
developed to skip over television advertising, and counter-technology is
always in development to try to get advertising before unwilling viewers.
People tend to prefer advertising that they actively seek (“pull” advertis-
ing), such as the internet videos and web pages they can visit if they
choose to obtain more information about a product (or to be enter-
tained by an ad).  Advertisements that slow down web pages, social
media applications, and highway traffic, and that distract viewers from
their tasks (“push” advertising), are ones that audiences wish to avoid.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\30-OL\NDE001.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-JUN-16 9:14
2016] CITIZENS UNITED, LIBERTY, AND JOHN STUART MILL 13
Given a choice, most viewers of commercial “push” advertising would,
on most occasions, prefer to avoid it.
Thus, consumer autonomy would be expanded if individual people
could avoid advertising they wish to avoid, and easily find advertising
information they seek.  Everyone is a consumer, and only a minority
would have their utility negatively affected as owners or investors in
businesses that could not use push advertising strategies.  These utility
losses might be offset, in many cases, by utility gains the same people
have as consumers, or as beings in the world otherwise irritated and
distracted by push advertising.  Nor does Mill’s principle of liberty
come into play, since commercial advertising falls in the domain of
trade, which is governed by Mill’s principle of utility alone.  Though it
goes beyond the scope of this article, it seems likely that pull, but not
push, advertising would be protected by Mill’s principle of utility.
Most importantly for our purposes is that commercial advertising
must be sufficiently truthful to produce positive utility; otherwise it is
not justified by Mill’s philosophy.  False advertising threatens to reduce
aggregate utility by undermining the ability to make informed choices.
While Mill opposes suppression of opinions that the government deems
false, since the government is neither infallible nor has authority to
determine what is true, advertising claims pose significantly different
considerations.  First, commercial advertising claims are not advanced
as opinions about truth, nor do they function in society as such.  They
are expertly engineered with the aim of selling products for financial
gain.55  Second, commercial advertising claims generally can be verified
by empirical evidence.  Their veracity is not nearly as difficult to judge
as claims about politics, religion, morality, and so forth.  While the gov-
ernment is not infallible in determining which advertising claims are
true, it is at least more impartial than the companies who seek to profit
from their advertisements, and the well-being of the public—to which
businesses may be indifferent—is the government’s proper objective.
And, since trade is a social act, businesses engaged in trade are not
protected by the principle of liberty.
Mill speaks of “the existence of classes of persons with an interest
opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of
living is grounded on the counteraction of it.”56  Mill’s examples are
pimps, those who run gambling establishments, and sellers of liquor.
He says that individual liberty to fornicate, gamble, and drink is pro-
tected by the principle of liberty, and that the government lacks author-
ity to prohibit these actions.  “The interest, however, of these dealers in
promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in impos-
ing restrictions and requiring guarantees which, but for that justifica-
tion, would be infringements of legitimate liberty” of the patrons.57
Mill therefore believes that the state is morally authorized to intervene
to prevent businesses, motivated by profit, from enticing people to
55. See, e.g., CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT 182–212 (2012).
56. Mill, supra note 3, at 296.
57. Id. at 297.
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make imprudent decisions.  Besides, Mill specifically recognizes that
society has a legitimate role in preventing “fraud.”58  Thus, Mill would
support the legal prohibition of false advertising claims on utility
grounds, despite his general opposition to government suppression of
claims that it deems false.
United States law recognizes the importance of truthful advertising
by regulating commercial advertising claims and holding businesses
accountable for their content.  By contrast, in political advertising, cor-
porations and individuals can get away with misleading and sometimes
untrue advertisements they broadcast and publish on the quite serious
subject of political elections.  Even claims that are debunked tend to
live on in public discourse and continue to serve as the basis of political
decision-making for many.  The speakers who make intentionally mis-
leading statements are not held accountable.  Because political advertis-
ers obtain results favorable to them by prevarication or fabrication,
there is no incentive to tell the truth.  And, it becomes extremely diffi-
cult for citizens to weigh the conflicting disinformation they receive,
even if they are intelligent and diligent.  Political decisions are treated
as less important than consumer choices, since social institutions guar-
antee consumers the means to avoid lies and manipulation to a far
greater extent than they provide voters with the same.  Mill held that
consumers should be protected against fraud on utilitarian grounds.
He believed that the state is morally authorized to prevent businesses
from enticing people to make imprudent decisions to increase business
revenues.  He favored social institutions that promote government
transparency and that collect accurate, easy-to-access information.59  He
also opposed private funding of election campaigns, reluctantly
accepting money from supporters out of necessity given the political
practices of his time, while making it clear to them that as a member of
parliament he would not favor their preferences in return and would
still vote his own conscience.60  Mill would almost surely oppose the
current political advertising practices in the United States.
Many political advertisements are false or misleading.  The public
regards the negative campaign advertising and personal attacks that run
for months in the media as a nuisance.  How can deregulation of corpo-
rate political expenditures be necessary to protect listeners’ rights to
hear what corporations have to say?  The Court’s claim to this effect is
result-oriented fiction.
As we have seen, from a Millian standpoint, Citizens United is
counterproductive to the two liberty rights justifications the Court
offers for its decision.  Constitutional distinction among natural and
corporate speakers is permitted, and as I will argue, would enhance
rather than detract from human liberty.  A listener’s right to hear cor-
porate political speech is fiction, comparable to a laborer’s right to
work for less than a minimum wage set by the government.
58. See, e.g., id. at 292–93.
59. Id. at 308–09.
60. Mill, supra note 54, at 272–75.
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C. Access to Information for Political Decision-Making
Another justification the Court offers in Citizens United is that peo-
ple have a right to information for effective political decision-making.
This justification is closely related to the justification previously dis-
cussed, the speaker’s right to hear others’ views.  It functions differently
in the Court’s effective democracy argument than in its liberty rights
argument, however.  The latter concerns the exercise of individual
autonomy, whereas the former concerns utilitarian social benefits that
flow to each person in a well-run democracy.  Moreover, as a liberty
right, the right to hear speech encompasses every type of protected
speech content, whereas access to information for political decision-
making specifically pertains to political speech, which is more rigor-
ously protected under the First Amendment than other forms of
speech.
As the Citizens United Court and Mill both agree, a free marketplace
of ideas is essential to an effective democracy.  Citizens must have access
to the information they need to make informed political decisions.  So
does allowing corporations to spend as much as they want, whenever
they want, advance this interest?  There is ample evidence that it instead
undermines the efficacy of citizens’ decision-making processes, both in
specific instances, and as a matter of general policy and practice.  I will
briefly discuss two specific instances in which citizen decision-making
has been undermined by corporate spending.  These instances involve
gun control legislation and Genetically Modified Organism (“GMO”)
labeling laws.
First, consider gun control legislation.  The National Rifle Associa-
tion (“NRA”) is a 501(c)(3) corporation, which is a nonprofit, tax-
exempt charitable or educational organization, largely funded by the
firearms industry,61 whose mission is to defend the rights of Americans
to “acquire, possess . . . and enjoy the right to use arms.”62  It opposes
virtually all regulation of gun ownership, transfer, and use, no matter
how modest, despite wide public support, even among NRA members,
for many gun control measures.  It is stunningly successful: gun control
legislation nearly always meets defeat, even after the most hideous of
tragedies, including the murder of twenty children and six adults in an
elementary school.  A “We the People” petition filed after this incident
called for stricter gun control measures,63 but the People were no
61. Walter Hickey, How the Gun Industry Funnels Tens of Millions of Dollars to the NRA,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/gun-industry-
funds-nra-2013-1; Peter Cohan, The NRA Industrial Complex, FORBES (July 23, 2012, 9:23
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2012/07/23/the-nra-industrial-com
plex.
62. The NRA’s mission statement is available at National Rifle Association of America,
GUIDESTAR, http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/53-0116130/national-rifle-associa-
tion-america.aspx#mission (last visited July 11, 2014).
63. Mary Bruce, Petition Calls on White House to Address Gun Control, ABC NEWS (Dec.
14, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/12/petition-calls-for-white-
house-to-address-gun-control.
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match for the NRA.64  Besides its huge war chest, the NRA also rates
U.S. Senators and members of Congress, as well as state legislators, by
how consistently they oppose gun regulation.65  Legislators whose con-
stituencies are enthusiastic about guns fear a low rating by the NRA,
which they often believe could lose them the next election.66  The NRA
is even said to be the cause of President Obama’s nominee for Surgeon
General, Vivek Murthy, withdrawing himself from consideration.
Murthy was opposed by the NRA because he remarked that guns pose
certain public health risks, and shortly after being contacted by the
NRA, many senators said they would not confirm Murthy.67
The NRA’s political power undermines the democratic self-government
of the American people, who support many gun control measures the
enactment of which they are unable to accomplish.68  The human
members of society are not, therefore, able to govern themselves demo-
cratically.  They cannot collectively prevent bodily violence against
themselves, so they cannot ensure their own personal security.  Security
and liberty are the two essentials of well-being without which people
cannot live the happiest possible kind of life.69  Thus, people’s self-
development is undermined as well as their autonomy.  And finally, and
ironically, their right to speak freely and truthfully on issues of important
64. Jonathan Weisman, Senate Blocks Drive for Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/senate-obama-gun-control
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
65. See, e.g., Rating Group: National Rifle Association: 2012 Candidate Positions on Gun
Rights, PROJECT VOTE SMART, https://votesmart.org/interest-group/1034/rating/8741#
.VwMXFHoYOwg (last visited July 11, 2014); Bob Price, NRA Releases Coveted Endorsements
and Grades for Texas State Races, BREITBART (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-
Government/2014/01/29/NRA-Releases-Coveted-Endorsements-and-Grades-For-Texas-
State-Races; How the N.R.A. Rates Lawmakers, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2012/12/19/us/politics/nra.html?_r=0.  For a glimpse into how
the public perceives ratings and/or NRA influence as influencing lawmakers, see, e.g.,
Bruce Rogers, NRA Winning the Influence Battle over Gun Control, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2013, 5:08
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucerogers/2013/02/01/nra-winning-the-influence-
battle-over-gun-control; J.C. Hagan, Letter to the Editor, Fear of the NRA Pressures Missouri
Legislators, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
opinion/mailbag/letters-to-the-editor/fear-of-the-nra-pressures-missouri-legislators/arti-
cle_aeace048-bcd6-5c05-993b-16e9f0680f2b.html.
66. If even a minority of Americans oppose gun control so strongly that they are
willing to vote based on this single issue, ensuring the defeat of legislators who support
gun control, why is this not simply the democratic process at work?  The NRA’s influence
depends more on inaccurate perceptions of its power than an actual correlation between
the candidates it endorses and political outcomes. E.g., Tom Ashbrook, On Point: Gun
Control, 90.9 WBUR (Dec. 17, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2012/12/17/
gun-control.
67. Paul Waldman, Vivek Murthy, the NRA and the Politics of Fear, WASH. POST (Mar.
18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/03/18/vivek-
murthy-the-nra-and-the-politics-of-fear.
68. See, e.g., Seth Cline, Strong Majority of Americans, NRA Members Back Gun Control,
U.S. NEWS (Jan. 28, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/
28/strong-majority-of-americans-nra-members-back-gun-control; Guns, GALLUP, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited July 13, 2014); Guns, POLLINGRE-
PORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm (last visited July 13, 2014).
69. Mill, supra note 26, at 250–51 (“[S]ecurity no human being can possibly do
without . . . .”).
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public concern is circumscribed, as Dr. Murthy can attest.  Fear of the
NRA chills important public health research.  Centers for Disease Con-
trol (“CDC”) researchers abandoned studying the health effects of gun
use in the 1990s after the NRA complained to Congress that the CDC
was using the results of its research as “propaganda” for gun control
measures, and Congress cut the CDC’s funding in response.  Research-
ers fear that simply reporting the results of studies involving gun inju-
ries or deaths will be construed by Congress as advocating for gun
control, which Congress has prohibited the CDC from doing.70
GMO labeling laws serve as a second example of how corporate
expenditures undermine citizen self-government.  In 2012, California
placed on its ballot a proposed law (Proposition 37) requiring the label-
ing of genetically engineered foods as such.  At the end of September,
sixty-five to seventy-five percent of likely voters supported the measure,
most of them because “people have a right to know what is in their
food.”71  However, the measure was defeated by a narrow margin.72
Monsanto, DuPont, and many other “Big Food” companies spent mil-
lions of dollars in advertising to kill the measure,73 and consumer and
environmental groups74 were no match for them.  Charitably inter-
preted, the measure’s defeat could show that Citizens United was rightly
decided, for here corporations engaged the citizenry in valuable politi-
cal debate, informing them of real dangers of the measure and placing
them in a position to make a better, more informed political decision.
But that interpretation is not supported by the evidence.
An economist and graduate student at Oklahoma State University
studied public perceptions of the GMO labeling measure, and reported
that:
California voters were highly uninformed about the use of genetic
engineering in general and about Prop 37 in particular. . . .  When
asked what percentage of corn, soybean, and wheat acres were
planted with GE varieties in the United States, respondents indi-
cated, on average, 48%, 47%, and 45% respectively (the reality is
88%, 93%, and 0%).
70. Republicans Block CDC Research on Gun Violence, TAKEAWAY (June 30, 2015), http:/
/www.thetakeaway.org/story/gop-rejects-gun-violence-research.
71. JAYSON L. LUSK & BRANDON MCFADDEN, VOTER’S INTENTIONS ON PROPOSITION 37
REQUIRING MANDATORY LABELING OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS IN CALIFORNIA 1
(2012), http://agecon.okstate.edu/faculty/publications/4369.pdf; Marc Lifsher, Poll
Finds Prop. 37 Is Likely to Pass, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/sep/27/business/la-fi-prop37-times-poll-20120927.
72. Lauren Lloyd, California Votes No on Prop 37, GMO Foods Will Not Be Labeled,
LAIST (Nov. 7, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://laist.com/2012/11/07/california_votes_no_on_
prop_37.php.
73. Amy Westervelt, Monsanto, DuPont Spending Millions to Oppose California’s GMO
Labeling Law, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/amywes-
tervelt/2012/08/22/monsanto-dupont-spending-millions-to-oppose-californias-gmo-label
ing-law.
74. California Right to Know is a coalition of consumer and environmental groups
that produced the YES Prop 37 ad. See YES ON 37, http://www.carighttoknow.org (last
visited Feb. 21, 2016).
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The researchers also found that
After watching the “YES Prop 37” commercial, the percentage of
voters indicating an intention to vote YES was 77.3%, almost iden-
tical to the vote indicated prior to watching the commercial.  How-
ever, after watching a “NO Prop 37” commercial, only 59.5%
indicated an intention to vote YES on Prop 37.  Thus, at least
among the two commercials we considered, the “NO Prop 37”
video was much more effective.75
What this seems to suggest is not that corporate advertising provides
more information so that the voter can become more informed, but
rather that most people have become accustomed to making political
decisions based on the cherry-picked, manipulated information that
biased sources place in front of them.  Without these commercials peo-
ple might find, or demand, more reliable ways of obtaining political
information.
Some accept “interest group politics” as an unobjectionable feature
of the American political landscape.  On this view, a political position
prevails when, roughly, the product of the number of its supporters,
multiplied by the strength of support of each, exceeds that of its oppo-
nents.  In the Prop 37 case, the outcome would suggest that the con-
sumer and environmental groups who supported Prop 37 had weaker
combined support than food manufacturers.  But this is a misleading
picture.  Organizing people around a cause is costly and time-consum-
ing even when people are eager to participate.  Additionally, busy peo-
ple with many responsibilities and concerns must be convinced to
devote time and money to this cause, instead of another, even if they
care about its success.  Corporations are already organized around a
cause and are practiced at marshaling resources to achieve their aims.
The playing field is unequal even before considering corporate legal
advantages that facilitate wealth accumulation.  In California, the Prop
37 corporate advertisements were more effective than consumer and
environmental group advertisements because corporations successfully
funneled their pre-existing resources to market research, crafting more
convincing ads.  Corporate interests achieved their objective even
though, or perhaps because, voter beliefs remained highly inaccurate.
Higher spending determined the policy but did not make available to
voters more accurate or complete information.76
75. LUSK & MCFADDEN, supra note 71, at 1.
76. Washington State’s experience was similar to California’s. THE ELWAY POLL, I-
522: SUPPORT FOR FOOD LABELING INITIATIVE SWINGS NEGATIVE 41 POINTS SINCE SEPTEMBER
(2013), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/808500-elway-poll.html; see also
Washington Voters Rejecting GMO Labeling Law, KING 5 NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013, 9:29 AM), http:/
/legacy.king5.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/05/13345368/.  Vermont has become
the first state to pass a GMO labeling law. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Vermont Just Passed the
Nation’s First GMO Food Labeling Law.  Now It Prepares to Get Sued, WASH. POST (May 9,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/04/29/how-vermont-
plans-to-defend-the-nations-first-gmo-law.  Connecticut and Maine also have passed GMO
labeling laws that will not “trigger” until other states also enact GMO labeling laws.
Pamela Prah, Many States Weigh GMO Labels, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 13, 2014), http:/
/www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/03/13/many-states-
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Thus, allowing corporations to spend as much as they want when-
ever they want does not appear to enhance citizens’ ability to make
informed political decisions.  The amount of money spent on a view-
point does not reflect that viewpoint’s merit or breadth or strength of
support.  Ideas, not dollars, should compete in the political market-
place.  Huge corporate expenditures for political campaigns reduce not
only the quality of citizens’ political decisions, but also the quality of
government functioning.77  And these commercial interests have little
to do with, and often undermine, human interests.
Mill would regard as important that campaign finance restrictions
are not paternalistic.  Censorship of what the public may hear is not the
issue.  Corporate domination of the political process deprives people of
opportunities to hone critical capacities that Mill values and nullifies
the dignity of governing ourselves.  It makes self-government not a
cooperative community enterprise, but more like buying a household
appliance.  It concedes all the important policy decisions to others.
One might say: the problem here is not corporate influence, but popu-
lar indifference to politics and government.  When such indifference,
or lack of self-efficacy, is so widespread however, there is good reason
not to place all of the blame on the people who are indifferent.  Much
of the problem is caused by the institutional structures that discourage
and even disgust potential voters.  Mill maintains that social institutions,
and especially electoral institutions, have an indispensable role in facili-
tating behavior that conduces to high aggregate utility.78
Whether voters’ indifference, poor education, or underdeveloped
reasoning skills are what lead to ineffective political participation, Mill
prefers for institutions to take citizens as they are while continuing to
provide them better opportunities to educate and develop themselves.
Mill would favor organizing institutions to optimize voter behavior
given the circumstances, instead of supporting institutions that make
the degree and quality of political participation even worse.  Consider
Mill’s stance on democratic government.  He fears the potential for
undereducated, working class people to seek whatever they regard as in
their self-interest at the expense of the general good.  What is in the
common interest is usually ascertainable only by those adequately edu-
weigh-gmo-labels.  For Maine, “at least five contiguous states” including Maine must pass
such laws; “[t]he Connecticut law will take effect once a combination of Northeastern
states with at least 20 million residents endorses similar legislation.” Id. The point of
these laws is to avoid being singled out for lawsuits by the food industry. Id.
77. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE GILDED AGE 261–62 (2008).  Bartels analyzes Senate votes, and demonstrates that U.S.
Senators’ responsiveness to low income people is negative, while their responsiveness to
high income people is much greater than their responsiveness to middle income people.
Id. As he remarks, “the modern Senate comes a good deal closer to equal representation
of incomes than to equal representation of citizens.” Id.  So “favoritism” and “influence”
appear closely related to the amount of money a person—artificial or natural—has at its
disposal. See generally id. at 252–82.  And because of all the advantages that corporations
are granted, there are, no doubt, many more artificial persons who can buy favoritism and
influence than natural ones. Id.
78. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in 19 THE COL-
LECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL IN 33 VOLS., supra note 3, at 371, 390–93.
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cated.  Mill believes it necessary, partly for this reason, to have signifi-
cant checks on majority power.  The future of society, on Mill’s view,
depends on the working classes becoming better educated so they will
be able to make informed and socially responsible decisions.79  Mean-
while, well-designed electoral and judicial institutions can maintain a
balance of political power that will accrue to the benefit of all members
of society.  Undereducated working class people might prioritize mate-
rial gains for themselves, but demands for such things could be moder-
ated by those with better judgment and more knowledge.  Mill views the
institutional structure of democracy as crucial in ensuring that demo-
cratic government lives up to its potential.  When people vote for which-
ever cause or candidate expends the most advertising funds, this
practice displaces potential better practices for obtaining information
to make voting decisions.
When there are collective action problems, the government has a
critical role in providing mechanisms for people to effectuate their
choices (providing they will not thereby be empowered to harm others
unjustifiably).  Modern election practices in the United States, con-
versely, discourage participation, undermine the average voter’s sense
of political efficacy, and disgust many citizens, who consequently with-
draw from political participation.  Given the state of election practices,
withdrawal may be both rational and excusable rather than a sign of
political indifference.  The urgent need to reform poorly structured
political institutions is not alleviated, but is intensified, by the equally
compelling need to improve citizens’ civic education and skills.  Thus,
campaign finance restrictions are not paternalistic, but instead neces-
sary to effectuate people’s legitimate political choices, and it is likely
that Mill would support them.
D. Protection for Political Dissenters
We are left with the Court’s fourth and final reason for its decision
in Citizens United: the importance of protecting political dissenters.
Because it is an effective democracy justification, protection for political
dissenters specifically pertains to political speech.  How do campaign
reform measures of the sort struck down in Citizens United affect the
ability of individuals to express political dissent?
The Court places much emphasis on the Constitutional imperative
to prevent the government from intruding on citizens’ First Amend-
ment rights to hear what corporations have to say.  Historically, the
model that the Court uses applies when the government oversteps its
bounds and interferes with the freedom of a human individual to
receive and evaluate information.  Police and state-tolerated mob bru-
tality directed toward civil rights protestors, and arrests of students pro-
testing the Vietnam War in the 1960s, are examples of this kind of
government overreach.  Attempts were made to keep these speakers’
messages from the voting public.  The First Amendment was intended
79. Mill, supra note 30, at 763–65.
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to protect those who protest against government actions and policies, as
the Court maintains.
The rights and interests of numerical minorities can easily be disre-
garded by tyrannical majorities and by a powerful government.  Mill’s
On Liberty, like many provisions of the Constitution, is intended to pro-
tect minorities from this danger.  To be a dissenter, one must dissent
from what current law or social policy is or against what the majority
favors.
Identifying dissenters requires recognizing the established or
majority view to which it is adverse.  Thus, in the narrow context of
Citizens United, there is a sense in which corporations may be under-
stood as dissenters.  They dissent from provisions established by BCRA.
As discussed earlier, Mill would not recognize corporations as entities
with moral rights protected by the principle of liberty, but the human
individuals affected by their participation in corporations (investors,
trustees, managers, etc.) can be recognized as dissenters from cam-
paign reform, if indeed they are such.  Human dissenters enjoy the pro-
tection of Mill’s principle of liberty, which forbids government to
silence or censor opinions providing that the means of expression do
not harm other people without the consent of those other people.
Since corporations cannot claim the protection of the principle of
liberty, how they should be socially regulated is determined directly by
the principle of utility.  From the perspective of a benevolent spectator
trying to assess the utility of various sorts of social rules, it does not
appear that much utility would be lost by implementing campaign
finance rules such as BCRA § 203, restricting the donation of funds
from corporate treasuries to political campaigns.  Few would be
affected and none would be restricted in the way that people find most
painful, i.e., unduly burdened in a quest to live a life of one’s own
choosing.  Coercive regulation of personal relationships (including
family), choice of occupation, residential neighborhood, how to spend
one’s leisure time, which talents to develop, etc., are the sorts of regula-
tion to which people reasonably object.  However, business regulation
does not prevent a person from living the life she prefers.  It affects a
small domain of life, and there are other ways to achieve the same basic
objectives: in the case of BCRA, one can (e.g.) make a personal dona-
tion, or establish a political action committee, which can contribute to
political campaigns.  This is how individuals’ “freedom to unite[ ] for
any purpose not involving harm to others”80 is given effect in the Amer-
ican electoral system.
In Citizens United we do not find a politically powerless group whose
rights are in danger of being trampled, but powerful artificial entities
serving the interests of a wealthy and powerful minority of human
beings, undermining the democratic rights and interests of a dis-
empowered numerical majority.  Protection for political dissenters, in a
broader sense than opposition to a single established policy, law, or
majority preference, is a guarantee that less powerful entities can
80. Mill, supra note 3, at 226.
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express themselves, organize, and communicate with the like-minded,
rather than being threatened or silenced by more socially powerful enti-
ties.  As noted earlier, the most socially powerful entities used to be the
State, churches, and public opinion; now private industry, a significant
portion of which is comprised of large corporations, is more powerful
than any church or the court of public opinion, and is arguably as pow-
erful as the State.  The notion of protecting dissenters arises from the
recognition that dissenters are vulnerable and in need of protection
from more powerful social forces and that they may have something
socially important to say (as civil rights and Vietnam War protesters
did).  However, in the United States, corporations appear far from vul-
nerable.  Ordinary human citizens, who are more numerous and are
the bearers of stringent moral rights to liberty, are more vulnerable to
harm by corporations than corporations are vulnerable to harm by
other social actors.
Presently in the United States the campaign reform measures
reviewed in Citizens United, had they been upheld, would not have jeop-
ardized the ability of any person to express her political views.  Suppose,
while BCRA § 203 was still in place, the CEO of Umbrella Corporation
wished to express her view that campaign finance reform is misguided.
BCRA § 203 would not have impeded her efforts in any way.  If she
wished to oppose a candidate based on the candidate’s support for cam-
paign finance reform, she would have had many ways of reaching the
public with her message.  She could even use funds from Umbrella’s
treasury, if she were authorized to do so, prior to the abeyance period
(beginning thirty days before a primary election or caucus, or sixty days
before a general election).  If she wanted to keep broadcasting opposi-
tion to the candidate during the abeyance period, she could establish a
PAC and keep broadcasting her message using PAC funds.  She could
volunteer to work on the campaign of the candidate she hopes will win,
campaign door-to-door, make telephone calls, host a fundraiser, recruit
or pay people to stand on street corners with signs, etc.
To answer the question we began with, then: the campaign finance
measure struck down in Citizens United would not have impeded any-
one’s ability to express political dissent.  BCRA § 203 does not prevent
any individual person from expressing her political view in any way.
Although the heightened protection afforded by the principle of liberty
does not apply to corporations, business corporations are not in any
danger of having their political views silenced, since they are economi-
cally and politically powerful.  Instead, corporations are the ones likely
to be harming and silencing human persons if government is not per-
mitted to intervene with reasonable, narrowly drawn campaign finance
reform measures, such as BCRA § 203.  In this context, the claim that
BCRA § 203 poses a grave threat to individual rights is disingenuous.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment, which was adopted to safeguard human lib-
erty, autonomy, and happiness, has been construed by the U.S.
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Supreme Court in a way that undermines these important foundational
values instead.  First, contrary to the Court’s assertion, there are signifi-
cant reasons to distinguish between human individuals and business
corporations as speakers for First Amendment purposes.  Business cor-
porations are artificial entities invented to serve human interests; they
do not have experiences or views of their own, and any rights they have
are contingent on the positive impact that bestowal of such rights has
on aggregate utility.  Left to pursue profits without effective institu-
tional constraints, they undermine the human interests they were cre-
ated to serve.  Second, the Court’s claim that deregulation of corporate
political expenditures is necessary to protect listeners’ rights to hear
what corporations have to say is as absurd as the claim that employment
regulations make employees worse off because they deprive them of
opportunities to work more hours for less pay in more dangerous con-
ditions.  Third, unrestrained corporate spending does not provide the
public with more useful political information than they would have in
its absence.  In fact, if the marketplace of ideas were not teeming with
the false and misleading statements generated by the political practices
that currently exist, alternative institutions could emerge to provide
more useful and reliable information.  Human beings might regain a
sense of political efficacy and improve collective well-being through
broad and diverse participation in government.  And fourth, corpora-
tions are too powerful to be in danger of being silenced by government,
and they do not deserve protection as political dissenters.
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